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The different faces of power in EU-Russia relations 
Tom Casier 
 
 ?WŽǁĞƌ ?ůŝŬĞůŽǀĞ ?ŝƐĞĂƐŝĞƌƚŽĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƚŚĂŶƚŽĚĞĨŝŶĞŽƌŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ ? ? ?EǇĞ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ? 
 
Introduction 
While one of the core issues in politics and international affairs, power is among the most difficult 
concepts to grasp. Different schools of thought have defined power in diverging ways and increasingly 
it has been acknowledged that power is not a one-dimensional concept, but one that works at different 
levels, in various ways. It is surprising that power in relations between Russia and the EU (or by 
ĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶ  ‘ƚŚĞ tĞƐƚ ? ? ŚĂƐ ŽĨƚĞŶ ďĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ŽĨ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ? ďƵƚ ŚĂƐ ƌĂƌĞůǇ ďĞĞŶ ƐƚƵĚŝĞĚ
systematically.1 The lack of critical reflection over conceptual issues of power has frequently led to 
reductionist views, narrowing power to a very limited context (e.g. energy dependence) and using one-
sided concepts of power (e.g. coercive capacity Žƌ ‘ŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞƉŽǁĞƌ ?). Tuomas Forsberg has indicated 
the need to look at power in EU-Russia relations differently and to approach the concept in a more 
nuanced and differentiated way (Forsberg 2013). This article seeks to rethink power relations between 
Moscow and Brussels in terms of Barnett ?Ɛ and Duvall ?ƐƚĂǆŽŶŽŵǇŽĨƉŽǁĞƌ (Barnett and Duvall 2005). 
Their categorisation of power is by no means the only possible or ultimate one, but it has the advantage 
of integrating different theoretical approaches to power and therefore encompassing a wide spectrum 
of interpretations, looking at power in its various disguises ŽĨ ‘ĐŽŵƉƵůƐŝŽŶ ?ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůďŝĂƐ ?ƉƌŝǀŝůĞŐĞ
ĂŶĚ ƵŶĞƋƵĂů ĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚƐ ŽŶ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?  ?ĂƌŶĞƚƚ ĂŶĚ ƵǀĂůů  ? ? ? ? P  ?  ? ? Barnett and Duvall present a 
taxonomy of power distinguishing between compulsory, institutional, structural and productive power 
(see the next section). This article uses their framework to obtain a better understanding of EU-Russia 
relations. In other words, the purpose is to bring the complexity of power back into the scholarly 
debate. First ĂƌŶĞƚƚ ?Ɛ ĂŶĚ ƵǀĂůů ?Ɛ ƚĂǆŽŶŽŵǇ ŝƐ ĂƉƉůŝĞĚ ƚŽEU-Russia interaction in the decade 
preceding the Ukraine crisis that started in 2014. In the last section their multi-dimensional framework 
is used to understand the dramatic change in power dynamics that took place with the crisis over 
Ukraine.2 In doing so, the article seeks to understand how the annexation of Crimea and consecutive 
developments implied a profound shift in the nature of the power struggle between Russia and the 
EU.  
The article seeks to make a contribution to our understanding of power in EU-Russia relations in the 
ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐǁĂǇƐ ?&ŝƌƐƚ ?ďǇĂƉƉůǇŝŶŐĂƌŶĞƚƚ ?ƐĂĚƵǀĂůů ?Ɛ ƚĂǆŽŶŽŵǇŽĨƉŽǁĞƌ ? ŝƚlooks at power from 
different angles, without a priori singling out any particular interpretation. In doing so the complexity 
of power, where multiple dimensions operate simultaneously, is acknowledged. This will lead to an 
analysis of issues such as identity production and institutional arrangements in the neighbourhood. 
                                                          
1 A recent exception is the Special Issue of JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies on EU power in the EU-Ukraine crisis 
(Cross and Karolewski 2017, Karolewski and Cross 2017). See also Forsberg 2013.  




The point is not that those have not been studied, but these issues have not often been approached 
in terms of a systematic power analysis. Secondly, the analysis seeks to understand power in EU-Russia 
relations by looking beyond their bilateral relations. The multi-dimensionality of power implies that 
power is not constrained to these bilateral relations. As will be explained in the theoretical section, 
power is not only exerted directly (in the bilateral relations between the EU and Russia) but also affects 
these relations indirectly (for example through arrangements with third countries). In other words, to 
fully understand power, we need to look at both direct and indirect forms of power. In this article 
indirect or diffuse power will mainly be explored through the role Russia and the EU play in their 
overlapping neighbourhood. The power they have over or in the countries in between determines their 
power position and therefore their internal, EU-Russia, power relations.  These two aspects of power 
are ultimately interrelated: increasing mutual concerns about the projection of power in the post-
Soviet space moved from a marginal position on the bilateral agenda to a core issue of competition. 
Thirdly, as explained below, power is not approached in terms of intentionalities. Whether power is 
the result of deliberate intent, or is the unintenĚĞĚĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞŽĨĂŶĂĐƚŽƌ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?
reputation, etc. does not matter. This is a clear added value of the model used here, because it avoids 
a classic trap in the analysis of relations between Russia and the EU, where the actual debate often 
concentrates on what Moscow and Brussels intend to achieve and on the power they intend to project. 
&ŝŶĂůůǇ ?ƚŚŝƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞĂĚĚƐĂŶĞǁĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽĂƌŶĞƚƚĂŶĚƵǀĂůů ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨĐŽŵƉƵůƐŽƌǇƉŽǁĞƌ ?
making a distinction between positive and negative compulsory power. 
The point made in this article is that power in EU-Russia relations cannot be reduced to a single 
category. Their relations can only be understood in its different co-existing dimensions of power. Yet, 
it will be argued that the Ukraine crisis of 2014 has led Russian leaders to believe that they had lost 
the competition for power with the EU and the West along the dimensions which were key prior to the 
crisis: that of institutional power (institutional arrangements in the overlapping neighbourhood) and 
that of structural/productive power (hegemony of constitutive norms and production of identities).3 
This perception has prompted Russia to a change of strategy after the regime change in Ukraine in 
February 2014. It now gave a higher priority to a strategy of compulsory power, annexing Crimea (an 
ĂĐƚ ŽĨ  ‘ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ? ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ? in a drastic surprise move and destabilising Eastern Ukraine. The latter is 
mainly aimed at preventing effective control by and to the advantage of the West. I will refer to it as 
 ‘ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ?ĐŽŵƉƵůƐŽƌǇƉŽǁĞƌ ?Importantly, this reinforced emphasis on compulsory power does not 
replace competition along any of the other power dimensions, that continue to co-exist. 
The article is structured as follows. The first section is conceptual. It presents the four concepts of 
ƉŽǁĞƌŝŶĂƌŶĞƚƚĂŶĚƵǀĂůů ?ƐƚĂǆŽŶŽŵǇ ?ĂƐĂŵŽĚĞůƚŽƐƚƵĚǇƚŚĞŵƵůƚŝ-dimensionality of power and 
gives an overview of how the four concepts of power feature implicitly in EU-Russia literature. In the 
next section it is argued that the logic of competition which developed in the decade preceding the 
2014 Ukraine crisis has often been mistaken for a struggle over compulsory power, while it was 
predominantly over institutional and structural power. The last section deals with the fundamental 
change in the power struggle since the Ukraine crisis, where the emphasis has eventually shifted 
towards a struggle over compulsory power.  
 
  
                                                          
3 It should be noted that norms are relevant to all four power dimensions. Yet, in the case of compulsory and institutional 
power, norms are regulative norms, constraining behaviour. In the case of structural and productive power, they are 




Bringing the complexity of power back in 
This article starts from the assumption that power is a complex phenomenon that operates along 
different dimensions for all actors. Different forms of power are not mutually exclusive but all operate 
simultaneously. To get rid of a priori assumptions about which types of power are relevant in EU-Russia 
relations, our analysis will be guided by the taxonomy of power of Barnett and Duvall (2005), that 
integrates diverging theoretical approaches to power and thus transcends major debates in 
International Relations.  
There are three major reasons why their ĂƌŶĞƚƚ ĂŶĚ ƵǀĂůů ?Ɛtaxonomy is particularly useful for 
studying EU-Russia relations. First, by acknowledging the plurality of concepts of power, their model 
allows to bring nuance and the complexity of power back into the debate. Secondly, the different forms 
of power are not mutually exclusive: Barnett and Duvall consider all of them to be present in all social 
relations. They operate simultaneously. Finally, their model does not presuppose intentionality. Power 
may also exist if an actor does not have the explicit intention to exert power. This is important to note 
for our study of EU-Russia relations, as the debate is to a great extent obscured by assumptions of 
intent. A substantial part of the analysis of EU-Russia relations interweaves power with the assumed 
intentions of both actors. It is important to realise the significance of this. In the rather dominant 
 ‘ŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ ƉŽǁĞƌ ?4 approaches, thĞ h ?Ɛ ĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ĚŝĨĨƵƐĞ ŝƚƐ ŶŽƌŵƐ ƚŽ ƚŚŝƌĚ ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ŝƐ
conventionally seen as driven by its ŝŶƚƌŝŶƐŝĐĂƚƚĂĐŚŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞƐĞŶŽƌŵƐ ?ƚŚĞhĂĐƚƐĂƐĂ ‘ĨŽƌĐĞĨŽƌ
ŐŽŽĚ ? ? ? ŶŽƚ ĂƐ ĚƌŝǀĞŶ ďǇ ĂŶ ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ƉŽǁĞƌ ? hƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƚĂǆŽŶŽŵǇŽĨ ĂƌŶĞƚƚ ĂŶĚƵǀĂůů
means that it is not per se ƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĞ h  ‘ŝŶƚĞŶĚƐ ? ƚŽproject its power or not. On the 
contrary, power is studied in terms of the de facto complex effects it produces. 
Barnett and Duvall ĚĞĨŝŶĞƉŽǁĞƌĂƐ  ‘ƚŚĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ŝŶĂŶĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƐŽĐŝĂů ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŽĨĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ ƚŚĂƚ
shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and faƚĞ ? ?ĂƌŶĞƚƚĂŶĚƵǀĂůů ? ? ? ? P
42).  They conceptually distinguish forms of power along two dimensions, reflecting major theoretical 
debates in International Relations. ĨŝƌƐƚĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶŚĂƐƚŽĚŽǁŝƚŚ ‘ƚŚĞŬŝŶĚƐŽĨƐŽĐŝĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ
which power workƐ ?  ?ĂƌŶĞƚƚ ĂŶĚ ƵǀĂůů  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ? dŚĞǇ ƚĂŬĞeither the form of interaction or of 
constitution. In the former case power is an attribute. Social actors are assumed to be given, pre-
constituted. In the case of constitution, ƉŽǁĞƌŝƐ ‘ĂƐŽĐŝĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨĐŽŶƐtituting what actors are as 
social beings, that is, their social iĚĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐ ĂŶĚ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?  ?ĂƌŶĞƚƚ ĂŶĚ ƵǀĂůů  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? Social 
relations themselves constitute meaning.  ƐĞĐŽŶĚ ĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶ ƌĞĨĞƌƐ ƚŽ  ‘ƚŚĞ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐŝƚǇ ŽĨ ƐŽĐŝĂů
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚǁŚŝĐŚĞĨĨĞĐƚƐŽŶĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐĂƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ ? ?ĂƌŶĞƚƚĂŶĚƵǀĂůů ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?As 
explained below, they are either socially specific and direct (assuming an immediate connection) or 
socially diffuse and indirect. 
These two analytical dimensions lead to the following matrix of four concepts of power, summarised 
in figure 1. Each concept will be explained below and it will be highlighted how it has featured in the 
literature on EU-Russia relations (with a focus on the analysis before the 2014 Ukraine crisis). 
  
                                                          
4 /ƚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŶŽƚĞĚŚĞƌĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞƉŽǁĞƌ ?ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĐŽŝŶĐŝĚĞǁŝƚŚĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐŽĨƉŽǁĞƌŝŶĂƌŶĞƚƚ ?Ɛ
ĂŶĚƵǀĂůů ?ƐƚĂǆŽŶŽŵǇ ?EŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞƉŽǁĞƌ ?ĂƐĚĞĨŝŶĞĚďǇDĂŶŶĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?ďĞůŽŶŐƐƚŽĂĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐĂůĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ ?/ƚƌĞƐƚƐ
ŽŶƚŚĞĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞďĂƐŝƐ ‘ŝƐĂĐƌƵĐŝĂůĐŽŶƐƚŝƵƚŝǀĞĨĞĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞh ? ?DĂŶŶĞƌƐ ? ?02: 252). Moreover, it is 
ďĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ?ĂƐŝƚĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇƐĞĞƐƚŚĞhĂƐĂĐƚŝŶŐ ‘ƚŽĐŚĂŶŐĞŶŽƌŵƐŝŶƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?
(Manners 2002: 252).  
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Figure 1: The taxonomy of power of Barnett and Duvall (2005: 48) 
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1.  ?ŽŵƉƵůƐŽƌǇ ƉŽǁĞƌ ? starts from a relational perspective. It refers to direct interaction between 
actors and their capacity to control the other actor ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ and circumstances. Compulsory power 
ŵĂǇďĞĞǆĞƌƚĞĚŽŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐŽĨďŽƚŚŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůĂŶĚŽĨ ‘ƐǇŵďŽůŝĐĂŶĚŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞreƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ?that an actor 
possesses (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 50). The latter may for example be the shaming of country for not 
respecting fundamental norms. This concept comes closest to classic concepts of power, such as 
ĂŚů ?Ɛ, in which power is the ability of one actor to make another actor do what it otherwise would 
not have done (or not do what it would have done) (Dahl 1957). 
The clearest example of work on EU-Russia relations that focuses on compulsory power are Structural 
Realist analyses, that look at relations in terms of how capabilities allow one actor to control the action 
of the other. Balance of power approaches, presenting an analysis in function of zero sum games and 
spheres of influence fit this category most neatly (see for example Mearsheimer 2014). However, it 
should be stressed that compulsory power does not imply that we are simply looking at military 
capabilitiĞƐŽƌŚŝŐŚƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?ƌƚŝĐůĞƐĨŽĐƵƐŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞůĞǀĞƌĂŐĞŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞĚďǇZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽƐŚƵƚ
down gas pipelines to Western Europe are equally focusing on compulsory power (see for example 
Baran 2007, Paillard 2010). 
One of the major biases is that a large part of the literature has one-sidedly focused on aspects of 
compulsory power in EU-Russia bilateral relations, looking at the capacity of control in direct 
interaction between both actors. Moreover, compulsory power ambitions has often been attributed 
predominantly to Russia.  As noted above, the country was often approached as a Realpolitik actor, 
driven by interests and seeking to maximise power. Many authors put a heavy emphasis on the threat 
Russia represents through its compulsory power (see for example Lucas 2009). On the other hand, a 
substantial part of the literature considered the EU to be a fundamentally different actor: power 
neutral or merely a norm promoter, soft or normative power (see for example Emerson 2009, Timmins 
2002). Moscow was seen as an actor that seeks to put pressure on neighbouring states in a forceful 
way and aims at direct control of the other, for example through restrictive trade measures or military 
threats, while the EU was presented as merely diffusing its norms without aiming at control over its 
neighbours. Similarly, Russia was perceived as trying to exert power over the EU through direct control 
over gas supplies, another form of compulsory power, this time in direct relations with EU member 
states. As a result, other categories of power have often been neglected and actions by the EU have 
implicitly been assumed to be power-neutral.  
2. Power as control may also take the form of  ?ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůƉŽǁĞƌ ? (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 48). The 
rules and regulative norms that make up institutions constrain and steer the actions or conditions of 
action of others. Control is indirect, because iŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞŶŽƚ ‘ƉŽƐƐĞƐƐĞĚ ?ďǇĂŶĂĐƚŽƌ, but varying 
institutional arrangements imply, for example, different capacities of agenda setting or unevenly 
distributed rewards. This is an idea prominent in Neoliberal Institutionalism. Also the concept of 
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interdependence reflects the idea of institutional power, as asymmetrical interdependence creates 
unequal control over outcomes and diverging costs. Power in this approach is diffuse, producing effects 
on different actors. It takes different forms and shapes according to the issue area.  
Institutional power approaches have been particularly strong in the field of energy, focusing on the 
interdependence between the EU and Russia (see for example Proedrou 2007). This interdependence 
is of an asymmetrical nature and  W in line with Keohane and Nye (1989) - is seen as creating a greater 
Russian control over outcomes, implying potentially higher costs for the EU. A considerable part of the 
literature has also focused on the diverging institutional arrangements both actors tried to set up in 
their overlapping neighbourhood. /ŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƚŚĞĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞh ?ƐĂƐƚĞƌŶWĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ
and the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union has received considerable scholarly attention over the 
last years (see for example Dragneva and Wolczuk 2012). Yet, many authors have been reluctant to 
analyse the power aspects of this institutional arrangement. It is mainly with increasing tensions over 
Ukraine and mounting pressure on the country to choose between EU-centred and Russia-centred 
rivalling initiatives that scholarly attention on power aspects rose. Yet, several authors have studied 
aspects of institutional power in EU-Russia relations long before the Ukraine crisis. The very idea of 
diffuse, indirect constraining effects of the ENP and Eastern Partnership is strongly present in for 
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ,ĂƵŬŬĂůĂ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŽŶhŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞŚĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ?,ĂƵŬŬĂůĂ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚŚŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ
has elements of structural power as well. dŽůƐƚƌƵƉ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚƐƚŚĞh ?ƐĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶ
ǁŝƚŚZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůŝŶĨůuence on democratisation in the post-Soviet states (Tolstrup 2013).  
 ? ? /Ŷ ƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨ  ‘ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůƉŽǁĞƌ ?, the social capacities of an actor are produced through a social 
process of mutual constitution: actors occupy structural positions in a specific set of direct, structural 
relations. The actors produce social capacities and identities through their social practices, but these 
practices are part of direct structural relations (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 52-53 and 55) of relatively 
ƐƚĂďůĞ  ?ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ƐƵƉĞr- ĂŶĚ ƐƵďŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 55). Social practices of 
domination are continuously reproduced and confirmed. Not only does this create privileges but it may 
ĂůƐŽŵĂŬĞƐƵďũƵŐĂƚĞĚĂĐƚŽƌƐ ‘ĂĐĐĞƉƚ ?ƚŚĞŝƌƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƚheir own identity and 
interests in function of this. This type of power analysis may be found inter alia in the work of 
Constructivists or Neo-Gramscianists.  
 ? ?tŚĞŶƉŽǁĞƌ ŝƐƐĞĞŶĂƐ  ‘ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞƉŽǁĞƌ ?, this social process of mutual constitution is seen as 
diffuse social processes,  ?ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬƐ ŽĨ ƐŽĐŝĂů ĨŽƌĐĞƐ ƉĞƌƉĞƚƵĂůůǇ ƐŚĂƉŝŶŐ ŽŶĞ ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ? ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ
ĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ŽĨ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ?(Barnett and Duvall 2005: 55). Those are not 
understood as structures, but rather as diffuse networks. Productive power thus implies historical  
contingency (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 56) in constant diffuse social processes of changing (rather than 
fixed) meanings and social identities. Power is thus intrinsic to daily diffuse discursive practices and 
systems of knowledge. It is the focus of Post-structuralist approaches. 
There is a stream of literature that has analysed EU-Russia relations (or broader the position of Russia 
in Europe) on the basis of structural and (less) of productive power, but most of this was rather in the 
margin. A large part of the literature focuses on fairly stable structures of subordination  W thus tending 
towards a structural power analysis -  in terms of centre and periphery (for example Morozov and 
Rumelili 2012; Browning and Christou 2010), of modernity and backwardness (Neumann 1998), or of 
post-modernity and modernity (for example Klinke 2012). ůƐŽƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨ ‘ŽƚŚĞƌŝŶŐ ?ŚĂƐďĞĞŶƵƐĞĚƚŽ
analyse Europe-Russia relations (Browning 2003). Thomas Diez has used the ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ ‘ŽƚŚĞƌŝŶŐ ?ŝŶ
his critique of normative power discourse, arguing that power is inherent to this representation, 
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because it constructs categories of Self and Other, in which the latter is represented for example as 
inferior or as an existential threat (Diez 2005: 628). Several scholars have studied identities in EU-Russia 
relations (see for example Sakwa 2011 and 2012, DeBardeleben 2012, Tsygankov 2007, Splidsboel-
Hansen 2002), though not all look into the power aspects. Neo-Gramscianist approaches equally cover 
structural power, approaching hegemony as not only coercion but also consent (see also Diez 2013). 
^ƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂů ƉŽǁĞƌ ĂůƐŽ ƐŚĂƉĞƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐĞůĨ-ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ? ŽĨ ĂĐƚŽƌƐ ĂŶĚ ĐĂŶ
 ‘ĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƐŽŵĞĂĐƚŽƌƐĨƌŽŵƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶĚŽŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĂƌŶĞƚƚĂŶĚƵǀĂůů ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?For the 
ƐĂŵĞ ƌĞĂƐŽŶ ? ,ĂƵŬŬĂůĂ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ĂůƐŽ ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶƐ Ă ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂů ƉŽǁĞƌĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶ ?Interesting new work 
exploring these theoretical horizons was produced by Morozov (2015), who brings in post-colonial 
theory to analyse the dialectic of the subaltern and the empire. He sheds new light on the tension 
between the Eurocentrism which Russia has internalised and its semi-peripheral position in Europe. In 
practice it is not always easy to classify EU-Russia literature in terms of structural and productive 
power. Partly this is due to the rather limited theorisation in studies of EU-Russia relations. Also Barnett 
and Duvall note the overlap between productive and structural power (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 55). 
For these different reasons, tŚŝƐ ĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ǁŝůů ůŽŽŬ ĂƚďŽƚŚ ƚǇƉĞƐ ŽĨ ƉŽǁĞƌ ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ  ‘ƐŽĐŝĂů
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?ũŽŝŶƚůǇ ?ĂƌŶĞƚƚĂŶĚƵǀĂůů ? ? ? ? P   ? ? 
In this article the taxonomy of power will be operationalised in the following way. Power through direct 
interaction (compulsory power) is explored by looking at direct bilateral EU-Russia relations, both in 
its material, symbolic and normative resources. Power through indirect or diffuse interaction 
(institutional power) is explored through EU-Russia interaction through the institutional arrangements 
they make in the overlapping neighbourhood. This choice is justified by the fact that this was the main 
area of contest and concern between both actors. Self-evidently it does not exclude other forms of 
institutional power, such as costs following from asymmetrical interdependence or control over 
multilateral institutions. Power through constitutive relations, direct (structural power) or diffuse 
(productive power) will be considered jointly. The focus of both constitutive forms of power will be on 
the production of identities, be it in stable hierarchical or fluctuating, contingent forms.  
 
The following analysis makes a comparison between power relations before and since the 2014 
Ukraine crisis. It explores the neglected power dimensions of EU-Russia relations before the crisis  W 
institutional, structural and productive -, arguing they are key to understand the logic of competition 
between Moscow and Brussels.  The article then investigates how the events of February 2014 in Kyiv 
have prompted Russian leaders to invest in a strategy which favours compulsory power, changing the 
balance between different types of power, albeit in a predominantly negative way of preventing full 
control by the Euro-Atlantic community. The analysis is in the first place a theoretical reinterpretation 
of power in EU-Russia relations, underpinned by references to relevant policy documents and 
discursive practices.   
 
Two additional conceptual and methodological points should be made in advance. First, with its 28 
ŵĞŵďĞƌƐƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŚĞhŝƐƚŽƐŽŵĞĚĞŐƌĞĞĂ ‘ĚŝƐĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚĞĚĂĐƚŽƌ ? ?ƌŽƐƐĂŶĚ
Karolewski 2017: 7) Before the Ukraine crisis of 2014, these actors were often highly divided on Russia. 
Russia has often been one of the most divisive issues within the Union and it is clear that bilateral 
relations between individual member states and Moscow are crucial to understand EU-Russia relations 
(see David, Gower and Haukkala 2013). This paper acknowledges this differentiation and will refer to 
ƚŚĞhŶŝŽŶ ?ƐĚŝǀŝĚĞĚŶĞƐƐǁŚĞƌĞƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ ?zĞƚĞǀĞŶǁŚĞŶĚŝǀŝĚĞĚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞĞŶŽƵŐŚƌĞĂƐŽŶƐƚŽƚƌĞĂƚƚŚĞ
h ?ƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇĂƐĂǁŚŽůe ĂŶĚƚŚĞhĂƐĂ  ‘ŶŽƌŵĂůĂĐƚŽƌŽŶƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐƚĂŐĞ ?  ?ƌŽƐƐĂŶĚ
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Karolewski 2017: 4), on the grounds of the common policy it developed towards Russia and the 
dialogue it engaged in, but equally because of a degree of commonality of images on which this policy 
was based. In no way, this is meant to underplay the diversity within the EU or contradictions within 
its policies.  
Secondly, this analysis focuses both on direct  and indirect dimensions of power between the EU and 
Russia. The latter implies focusing on the relations between those actors and their neighbouring states, 
because the institutional arrangements and identity production in the neighbourhood inevitably have 
implications for the power of Russia and the EU. Yet the purpose is not to make an analysis of  these 
relations (EU-neighbour; Russia-neighbour) themselves, but only to study them as indirect power 
dimension between Russia and the EU.  
In the following section the neglected power dimensions in the study of EU-Russia relations will be 
highlighted. It is argued that before the Ukraine crisis institutional, structural and productive forms of 
power co-existed with forms of compulsory power but did not receive equivalent scholarly attention.  
 
Analysing power before the Ukraine crisis: the neglected dimensions of institutional, structural and 
productive power 
Challenging this imbalanced approach to power, this section attempts to demonstrate that, until the 
crisis over Ukraine of 2014, the essence of the competition between the EU and Russia was not solely 
about compulsory power (as capacity of direct control over the other actor). While compulsory power 
was definitely present and at times very visible (for example in the energy conflicts of 2006 and 2009), 
the struggle over institutional, structural and productive power was equally if not more important. In 
other words the power relations between Moscow and Brussels were characterised to an important 
degree by their capacities of indirect control over the conditions in which they operate (institutional 
power) and by their capacities to produce identities and structures of subordination (structural power). 
Within these power relations the EU found itself in a rather hegemonic position and Russia was  W 
throughout the decade preceding the Ukraine crisis  W increasingly contesting and challenging this 
institutional and structural hegemony.  
Institutional power 
As mentioned in the previous section, ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ĂŶĚ ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?Ɛcompeting regional projects in the 
overlapping neighbourhood (i.e. the ENP/EaP and EEU) can be seen as conflicting ways of indirectly 
controlling the conditions in which the other actor operates. Therefore they form a clear instance of 
institutional power in EU-Russia relations. While originally in the margin of bilateral relations (Zagorski 
2010 ? ?ƵŶĞĂƐĞŽǀĞƌĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůůǇmade it to the heart of the EU-Russia 
agenda and became a major source of tensions. Russia was concerned that an Association Agreement 
between Ukraine and the EU would undermine its influence in the post-Soviet space  W an area where 
ŝƚĐůĂŝŵĞĚƚŽŚĂǀĞ ‘ƉƌŝǀŝůĞŐĞĚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ? ?DĞĚǀĞĚĞǀƋƵŽƚĞĚŝŶZĞǇŶŽůĚƐ2008); the EU was concerned 
that Ukrainian membership of the ECU/EEU would undermine its position in Eastern Europe.  
To back up this point, we will first illustrate how these rival integration projects, while as such not part 
of direct relations between the EU and Russia, do have an indirect impact on the capacity of the other 
ƚŽ ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƚ ŽƉĞƌĂƚĞƐ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ŝƚƐ  ‘ŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌŚŽŽĚ ?  ?ĂŶĚ ƚŚƵƐ ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞ
institutional power). We will do so on the basis of the choice Ukraine was facing in 2013 between 
signing an Association Agreement with the EU or joining the then Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) with 




reinforcing the view that institutional power was a most fundamental dimension of relations. 
Let us first rewind to the choice Ukraine had to make on the eve of the Vilnius Eastern Partnership 
summit in 2013. Fundamentally the choice was this. Either Ukraine liberalised trade with the EU by 
abolishing tariffs in the framework of an Association Agreement or it accepted the Common External 
Tariff of the ECU in case it decided to join the organisation. Precisely because of these tariff obligations, 
both choices were incompatible, at least in the absence of free trade arrangements between the EU 
and the ECU. Inevitably <Ǉŝǀ ?Ɛ choice would impact on trade and investment opportunities of both 
Brussels and Moscow: if Ukraine associated itself with the EU, this would indirectly reduce ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?Ɛ
control over the conditions in which it operates. Russia would have worse trade terms or fewer 
investment opportunities in Ukraine. If Ukraine decided to join the ECU instead of signing an 
Association Agreement with the EU, this would ĂĨĨĞĐƚ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ƚƌĂĚĞ ĂŶĚ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞůǇ ?
Indirectly hŬƌĂŝŶĞ ?ƐĐŚŽŝĐĞǁould thus change the control over the conditions under which the EU / 
Russia operate in their region.  
But there is more than just the impact of tariffs. Also the sizeable transfer of rules and norms under 
the Eastern Partnership determines the conditions under which third actors  W like Russia -  operate. By 
seeking to alter the political, legal and administrative system of neighbouring countries through the 
transfer of rules and institutional practices, the EU creates a wider European regulatory system that 
extends beyond its borders. While many of the rules may seem very technical, their transfer has clear 
power implications. By extending its regulatory sphere, the EU creates a wider economic sphere with 
relative stability and legal certainty. It goes without saying that this creates not only immediate 
economic opportunities for the EU, but also a beneficial environment in the longer term.  Neighbouring 
countries become anchored in this system and get entangled with the EU in different economic, legal 
and institutional ways, making a commitment to longer term cooperation with the EU more likely. This 
has been studied in other contexts ĂƐ  ‘ƐƚŝĐŬy ƉŽǁĞƌ ? ?ƵĞŶŐĞƌ  ? ? ?6). It is power because it creates 
comparative advantages. It is sticky because it implies costs of withdrawal for the countries concerned.  
As a result, the norms reflected in deep and comprehensive free trade arrangements, democracy 
promotion, foreign policy alignment, etc. produce regulatory and  ‘normative hegemony ? (Haukkala 
2008 and 2010). The rules and norms of the EU obtain a higher degree of legitimacy and become 
increasingly uncontested. The more countries accept these standards, rules and norms, the more this 
normative hegemony will be reinforced. This creates power in the form of longer term comparative 
advantages for the normative hegemon and negative effects on third countries  W Russia in this case. 
Ultimately it constrains the room for political manoeuvre and affects leverage, increasing fears in 
Moscow over relative isolation. This is exactly one of the reasons why Russia has put a strong emphasis 
on Eurasian integration as an alternative for integration within and with the EU (Putin 2011). The 
Eurasian Customs Union (ECU, as of 2015 the Eurasian Economic Union  W EEU) was presented as an 
escape from what is perceived as EU normative hegemony, with ƚŚĞ hŶŝŽŶ ?Ɛstandards ultimately 
determining what is acceptable and unacceptable. This is illustrated by this quote of Foreign Minister 
>ĂǀƌŽǀ P ‘dŚĞƌĞŝƐŽŶůǇŽŶĞĐƌŝƚĞƌŝŽŶƵƐĞĚ ?ďǇƚŚĞtĞƐƚĞƌŶpowers] to assess the readiness of a country 
ƚŽƉĂƐƐƚŚĞ “ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ ?ƚĞƐƚ W ƚŚĞŝƌƌĞĂĚŝŶĞƐƐƚŽĨŽůůŽǁŝŶƚŚĞƐůŝƉƐƚƌĞĂŵŽĨŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ? ? ?>ĂǀƌŽǀ ?
quoted in Averre 2008: 33).  
To summarise, EU-Russia power relations in the years before the Ukraine crisis were first and foremost 
ĂƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞŽǀĞƌƚŚĞh ?ƐŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞŚĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ?ZƵƐƐŝĂŶĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇĂŝŵĞĚĂƚĐŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐ
and contesting this hegemony. As Putin stated:  ‘ƵŶŝůĂƚĞƌĂůĚŝŬƚĂƚĂŶĚ ŝŵƉŽƐŝŶŐŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶŵŽĚĞů
produces the opposite results ? ? ?WƵƚŝŶsĂůĚĂŝ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?At the regional level Moscow  rejected an EU-
centric agenda and presented its alternative project for integration. At global level it challenged 
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Western hegemony through its neo-revisionist policy, aiming at making international structures of 
governance more representative and less dominated by the West (Sakwa 2012). In essence a key 
dimension of the power struggle was thus one over regional and global institutional arrangements that 
determined the conditions in which the EU and Russia operated and the comparative (dis)advantages 
for them. It was predominantly, but certainly not exclusively, about institutional power. 
Structural and productive power 
Another underrated major dimension of EU-Russia relations before the Ukraine crisis was a struggle 
over structural power and productive power. Here we enter the field of power through constitution,  
identity politics and the power that is generated through (non- ?ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞKƚŚĞƌ ?Ɛ ŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ?
Sakwa underlines its importance stating ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŵƵĐŚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉŽƐƚ-Cold War malaise is derived from 
ŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ ? ?^ĂŬǁĂ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ? The successful creation of categories of Self and Other produces 
potentially enduring patterns of subordination or exclusion. They may reinforce isolation of the 
counterpart and anchor other countries into a political system. Moreover, they make certain 
representations acceptable and confirm patterns of dominance. We perceive similar patterns here as 
in the case of institutional power, where the EU appears as a hegemonic producer of identities, but 
Russia challenges this hegemony, seeing for itself a  ‘ĐŝǀŝůŝƐŝŶŐŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞƵƌĂƐŝĂŶĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚ ? ?WƵƚŝŶ
quoted in Feklyunina, 2008: 619).  
The hegemonic position of the EU as identity producer derives from its self-image as embodying 
European values (see Laffan 2004, Simão 2011) in a discourse where Europe and the EU implicitly 
coincide. Intertwined with other forms of power, the EU has a strong capacity to recognise identities 
of other states or to withhold that recognition. Most interesting in this respect, is the evolution which 
this identity recognition underwent. In the 1990s both Russia and Ukraine were recognised in key EU 
documents as countries sharing European values, members of the European civilisation and family. 
This recognition has been maintained and even reinforced for Ukraine during the negotiations about 
the Association Agreement. dŚĞ ƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ŐĞŶĚĂ ? ĨŽƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘hŬƌĂŝŶĞ ĂƐ Ă
European country shares a common history and common values with the countries of the European 
hŶŝŽŶ ? dŚĞ h ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚ hŬƌĂŝŶĞ ?Ɛ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ĂƐƉŝƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ǁĞůĐŽŵĞĚ ŝƚƐ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ĐŚŽŝĐĞ ? ?
(Association Agenda 2009: 2). In the case of Russia, however, ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐƚŽŝƚƐ ‘ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŶĞƐƐ ? largely 
disappeared from EU discourse. This is a clear example of inclusion and exclusion, captured in various 
terms such as constituting centre and periphery (Browning and Christou 2010) or  ‘ŽƚŚĞƌŝŶŐ ?  ?ŝĞǌ
2005). Klinke indicates that a binary of a post-modern EU versus modern Russia is more than political 
rhetoric and is ingrained deeply within broader epistemic communities of experts, journalists and EU 
officials (Klinke 2012). A similar pattern can be discerned in the (non- ?ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?Ɛ
international status, as a different category of identity. While the EU formally recognised Russia as an 
ĞƋƵĂůƉĂƌƚŶĞƌ ?ƵƐŝŶŐƚŚĞůĂďĞůŽĨ ‘^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐWĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? as of the late 1990s), it withheld a recognition 
of Russia ĂƐĂ ‘ŶŽƌŵĂůŐƌĞĂƚƉŽǁĞƌ ? ?dƐǇŐankov 2005) and as a regional player. For example, when the 
EU refused to enter into direct negotiations with the Eurasian Customs Union, as Russia had demanded 
at the EU-Russia summit of June 2012, this was read by Moscow as unwillingness to recognise ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?Ɛ
regional leadership role.  
In Russia tŚĞh ?s policies weƌĞƐĞĞŶĂƐƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŶŐ ‘ĂƐƉŝƌŝƚŽĨƉƌŝŵŝƚŝǀĞZƵƐƐŽƉŚŽďŝĂ ? zĂƐƚrzhembsky 
quoted in Sakwa, 2014: 21). As a reaction to this hegemonic structural power of the EU, Russia 
developed a counter strategy, cŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐƚŚĞh ?ƐŵŽŶŽƉŽůǇŽŶŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ ?It has also put 
ĨŽƌǁĂƌĚĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞŶŽƌŵƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘ƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ?and started building its own identity around 
neo-traditionalist ideas. The latter has become more of a coherent ideological project (Sakwa 2014: 
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75) and ultimately seeks to make a similar claim to what the EU does, namely that Russia represents 
ĂŶĚƉƌŽƚĞĐƚƐ ‘ŐĞŶƵŝŶĞ ?ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶǀĂůƵĞƐ (see also the next section).  
To summarise, social relations of constitution were an important dimension of power between the EU 
and Russia. They involved the capacity to create socially accepted categories of identity, such as 
genuine Europeanness or great power status. Those do not only create privileges, but also categories 
of subordination or exclusion. In the final section, it will be argued that the Ukraine crisis led Russian 
leaders to believe that they had suffered a serious defeat in the struggle for institutional and 
structural/productive power. While the competition with the West continued on all fronts, Moscow 
took radical and unexpected action in the domain of compulsory power, taking control over Crimea 
and actively destabilising Ukraine post Yanukovych.  
 
The Ukraine crisis: a shift to  ?ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ?ĐŽŵƉƵůƐŽƌǇƉŽǁĞƌ 
Above it was suggested that the competition between Russia and the EU up to the start of the Ukraine 
crisis was to a large extent situated along the often neglected dimensions of institutional and 
constitutive forms of power. The events in Ukraine in early 2014 came after a long process of 
culmination of tensions in EU-Russia relations (Haukkala 2015), but produced a radical change in the 
nature of their struggle for power. The ousting of Yanukovych and the change of regime were seen in 
Moscow as a crucial defeat in this competition over institutional arrangements in the neighbourhood 
and over identity production. The pro-EU choice of the new regime in Kyiv paved the way to the signing 
of the Association Agreement and shattered ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐŚŽƉĞƐĨŽƌhŬƌĂŝŶĞƚŽũŽŝŶƚŚĞh. The fear that 
Ukraine would become part of a Western sphere of influence ? ǁĂƐ ƐĞĞŶ ĂƐ ŚĂƌŵŝŶŐ ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?Ɛ ǀŝƚĂů
interests. In reaction to the regime change Russia radically shifted its strategy towards one of gaining 
direct control (annexation of Crimea) and preventiŶŐ ‘ƚŚĞtĞƐƚ ?ĨƌŽŵƚĂŬŝŶŐĐŽŶƚƌŽů ?ĚĞƐƚĂďŝůŝƐŝŶŐĂŶĚ
polarising Ukraine). The dominant logic was one of a geopolitical zero-sum game. In the framework of 
the taxonomy of power, this radical change of strategy may be understood aƐƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂ ?Ɛ
understanding that it had to react forcefully and display strong compulsory power as it was losing out 
on other (institutional and structural) forms of power. Also Haukkala sees the developments over 
Ukraine in line with the longer term conflict over institutional arrangements in post-Cold War Europe: 
 ‘ƚŚĞĐƌŝƐŝƐ ŝŶhŬƌĂŝŶĞ ŝƐ ŝŶĨĂĐƚĂƉƌŽǆǇĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞhĂŶĚZƵƐƐŝĂ ?/ƚĐĂŶĂůƐŽďĞƐĞĞŶĂƐĂ
parting of ways with Russia clearly putting its foot down and renouncing its willingness to find its place 
in the unipolar EU-ĐĞŶƚƌŝĐƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?  ?,ĂƵŬŬĂůĂ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? Putin justified this shift of strategy towards 
compulsory power means, as a pure and inevitable reaction:  ‘ ?ƚŚĞŝŶĨĂŵŽƵƐƉŽůŝĐǇŽĨĐŽŶƚĂŝŶŵĞŶƚ ?
led in the 18th , 19th and 20th centuries, continues todaǇ ? ?ƵƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂůŝŵŝƚƚŽĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐ ?ŶĚ
with Ukraine, our western partners have crossed the line, playing the bear and acting irresponsibly and 
ƵŶƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůůǇ ? ?ZƵƐƐŝĂĨŽƵŶĚŝƚƐĞůĨŝŶa position it could not retreat from. If you compress the spring 
ĂůůƚŚĞǁĂǇƚŽŝƚƐůŝŵŝƚ ?ŝƚǁŝůůƐŶĂƉďĂĐŬŚĂƌĚ ?zŽƵŵƵƐƚĂůǁĂǇƐƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌƚŚŝƐ ? ? (Putin, 2014) 
The ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚZƵƐƐŝĂŚĂĚ ‘ůŽƐƚ ?hŬƌĂŝŶĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŵĞĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?ƉƌŽŵƉƚĞĚĂRussian strategy 
based on two forms of compulsory power. With the annexation of Crimea Russia resorted to direct 
control over territory to safeguard strategic interests and strengthen its position vis-à-vis the West. 
With the destabilisation of Eastern Ukraine, Moscow primarily aimed to prevent the Euro-Atlantic 
community from gaining effective control over the country, thus withholding it the privileges that a 
closer association with Ukraine would otherwise deliver. In other words, it sought to make Ukraine a 
liability, rather than a benefit for the West, backed by a rhetoric of UkƌĂŝŶĞďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐ ‘ĂĨĂŝůĞĚƐƚĂƚĞ ?
(Vladimir Chizhov, Russian Ambassador to the EU, quoted in Pop 2014). This form of preventing control 




The choice to play the radical card of annexation and destabilisation dramatically altered the nature of 
the power competition between Russia and the EU, shifting the emphasis from institutional and 
structural power to compulsory power. Ƶƚ ƚŚĞǇ ĂƌĞ ŶŽƚ ĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞůǇZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐƉŽǁĞƌ ŐĂŵĞ ? ZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ
between Russia and the EU/Euro-Atlantic Community on both sides are coloured significantly stronger 
by different forms of compulsory power.  This can be seen from the sanctions the EU and the US imposed 
ĂŶĚZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐƌĞƚĂůŝĂƚŝŽŶŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ?ĂƐŵƵĐŚĂƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇďƵŝůĚ-up on both sŝĚĞƐŽĨEdK ?ƐĞĂƐƚĞƌŶ
borders. These actions reflect the wide spectrum of instruments that may be categorised under 
 ‘ĐŽŵƉƵůƐŽƌǇƉŽǁĞƌ ? ?/ƚŐŽĞƐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƐĂǇŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŝŵƉůǇƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞĚŝǀĞƌŐŝŶŐŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐ
used by both parties are equivalent or comparable.  
Self-evidently the dramatic change in the nature of the power struggle does not imply either that power 
relations among other dimensions have come to an end. In other words, the (negative) compulsory 
power dimension has not become the exclusive one, but has received a new impulse along with 
continued competition over other forms of power. Institutional power competition continues as before, 
with Russia and the EU pursuing their respective regional integration projects. The EU signed Association 
Agreements with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in 2014 and took further steps in the field of visa 
liberalisation. On the Russian side, the Eurasian Custom Union was rebaptised the Eurasian Economic 
Union in 2015 and reinforced with the membership of Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. The same holds for 
structural and productive power. In the field of norms, the EU saw the developments in Ukraine as a 
legitimation of its norms  and proof of the hegemonic consent it received. It reinforced its self-equation 
with a European identity and embraced Ukraine more strongly as a European country, further increasing 
the gap with Russia. /ŶĂŶ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶƚŝĂů  ‘ƉĂůĞŽĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞ ŝĚĞŽůŽŐǇ ?ZƵƐƐŝĂĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞĚ ŝƚƐĞůĨ
ĨƌŽŵ  ‘ĨĂůƐĞ ? ƵƌŽƉĞ ĂŶĚ ƌeinforced its civilizational claim that it is the representative of genuine 
European values (Morozov 2017), for which it also seeks support in certain radical right circles in EU 
countries. Furthermore, Moscow reinforced its counter hegemonic stance. Foreign Minister Lavrov 
seized several opportunities to declare the advent of a  ‘post-Western world ? stating the liberal world 
ŽƌĚĞƌ  ‘was pre-programmed for crisis right from the time when this vision of economic and political 
globalisation was conceived primarily as an instrument for ensuring the growth of an elite club of 
countries and its domination over everyone else. ?  (Lavrov 2017) 
 
Conclusion 
Power, however hard to define, is complex and appears in many different disguises. In essence, the 
increasingly acrimonious relations between the EU and Russia in the years preceding the Ukraine crisis 
of 2014 were driven by a logic of competition over institutional arrangements in the overlapping 
neighbourhoods and over recognition of identities. Yet, a considerable part of the literature has 
studied EU-Russia relations in this era exclusively in terms of power as the capacity of direct control of 
one actor over the other.  
This article sought to bring the complexity of power back into the debate by using Barnett anĚƵǀĂůů ?Ɛ
taxonomy of power, suggesting that four different types of power  W compulsory, institutional, 
structural and productive - operate simultaneously. Both before and since the Ukraine crisis power 
operated along different dimensions. In the decade preceding the Ukraine crisis, other dimensions of 
power than compulsory power received limited attention, while those were key to understand the 
relations between Russia and the EU.  &ŝƌƐƚ ‘institutional power ? ?ƚŚĞĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽĐŽŶƚƌŽůƚŚĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ
of the other actor indirectly, was at the heart of the competition. This appeared most strongly in rival 
institutional arrangements in the overlapping neighbourhood (Eastern Partnership versus Eurasian 
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Economic Union) and in competing norm diffusion. Secondly the power relations were strongly 
ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞĚ ďǇ  ‘structural power ? - the capacity to produce and recognise identities, such as 
Europeanness, within fairly stable structures of subordination -, ĂŶĚ  ‘ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞ ƉŽǁĞƌ ?, whereby 
mutual constitution happens in diffuse and historically contingent networks. In both fields the EU held 
a hegemonic position, which Russia chose to contest and to challenge.  
The developments of early 2014 led to a radical change in this power struggle. Self-evidently, the 
competition for power continues along all four dimensions. But the regime change in Ukraine in 
February 2014, following the Euromaidan protests, led Russian leaders to believe - in a geopolitical 
reading of the events - that Russia had  ‘ůŽƐƚ ?Ukraine, and that Moscow  had been unsuccessful in its 
competition with the EU over institutional arrangements in the neighbourhood (institutional power) 
and over normative hegemony and identity production (structural and productive power). The ousting 
of Yanukovych and the pro-Western choice of the new government in Kyiv confirmed that Ukraine had 
become anchored more firmly in Western and EU-led institutional structures than ever before 
(institutional power). dŚĞ ƵƌŽŵĂŝĚĂŶ ƉƌŽƚĞƐƚƐ ŚĂĚ ƉƌŽǀĞŶ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵl, 
elevating the EU to the symbolic alternative for an unwelcome post-Soviet identity linked to Russia 
(structural/productive power). Still within this geopolitical framing, this prompted Russian leaders to 
a radical shift in strategy. While the struggle for power continued along all dimensions, Russia made a 
surprise move of drastic compulsory power, annexing Crimea and stirring up the conflict in Eastern 
Ukraine. It can be argued that Moscow pushed back on the front where it had not lost the battle. This 
led to a new logic of confrontation, based on enemy like structures, in which both sides resorted to 
power instruments aimed at direct control  through very diverse instruments such as annexation, 
destabilisation, sanctions, retaliation, military build-up. Since ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐĂƌĞŵĂŝŶůǇ
about preventing the Euro-Atlantic community from gaining effective control over Ukraine, this could 
be seen as a form of  ‘ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ?ĐŽŵƉƵůƐŽƌǇƉŽǁĞƌ ?/ƚŐŽĞƐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƐĂǇŝŶŐƚŚĂƚall this does not imply 
that other forms of power have lost their relevance. In the field of institutional power, Russia continues 
efforts to increase control over institutional arrangements in the neighbourhood: the Eurasian 
Customs Union was reformed into the Eurasian Economic Union. Armenia, a state which like Ukraine 
had to make a choice between economic integration with Moscow or Brussels, joined the Eurasian 
Economic Union in 2015. In the field of structural and productive power, Russia has reinforced its neo-
traditionalist or paleoconservative ideological stance, making a civilizational claim that Moscow 
represents the genuine values of Europe and positioning itself as a leader in the arrival of a post-
Western world.  
All this implies that a pluralistic approach to power retains its usefulness, also in times of direct 
confrontation and conflict. This is precisely where this article sought to make a contribution. Using the 
taxonomy of Barnett and Duvall. it brought a differentiated and multi-dimensional concept of power 
into a field where the concept of power has traditionally been mono-dimensional. Doing so adds 
nuance and deepens our insights into EU-Russia relations and the various settings of power. Moreover, 
as a more nuanced and multi-dimensional understanding of power highlights different aspects of 
power competition, this also contributes to understanding why perceptions in Moscow and Brussels 
diverge as much as they do.  
The taxonomy of power was theoretically further refined by ĂĚĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŽĨ  ‘ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ?
compulsory power, as a way of preventing control by competing parties. This concept is particularly 
ƵƐĞĨƵůƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐŝŶEastern Ukraine, primarily aimed at preventing the 
Euro-Atlantic community from obtaining beneficial control over the country.  It goes without saying 
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